










































This work oﬀers new insights into the determinants of service oﬀ-
shoring across countries and across service industries. Combining dif-
ferent data sources over the 2006-2009 period, I find that certain country
characteristics aﬀect oﬀshoring costs for all services, while the eﬀects of
other characteristics depend on the coordination requirements of the re-
spective service industry. The results from a zero-inflated Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood estimation indicate that the eﬀects of a membership
in NAFTA, and a common colonial past on service oﬀshoring patterns
depend on the task content of the services. These results are robust to
the control for unobservable country-level heterogeneity. The quality of
legal institutions, a common legal origin, geographic distance, and time
zone diﬀerences influence oﬀshoring patterns identically across all service
industries.
Keywords: Oﬀshoring; Services; Tasks; Coordination, Poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood
JEL classification: F14; F23; F20
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1 Introduction
Compared with other trade phenomena, service oﬀshoring has realized dynamic
growth rates since the mid-1990s. The considerable decline in communication
costs resulting from several technological improvements in the 1980s and 1990s
has initiated a change in the way countries trade and has caused many service
activities that were traditionally seen as non-tradable to become tradable. In
the United States imports of computer and information services as well as other
business services, which are mainly used as intermediate services by firms (e.g.
Amiti and Wei 2005), more than tripled in real terms from 1995 to 2009.1 How-
ever, because of data limitations, the empirical evidence on service oﬀshoring is
still fragmented. In this paper, I combine two prior strands of research to oﬀer
new insights on the determinants of U.S. service oﬀshoring patterns.
Recent trade models that build on the concept of supermodularity oﬀer the-
oretical guidance on how country and industry characteristics jointly influence
the pattern of trade (Costinot 2009b). Thus far, the empirical analyses have
focused on the interplay between institutional quality and industry-level insti-
tutional dependence. However, service industries do not diﬀer only in their
reliance on institutional quality. With the advent of oﬀshoring, scholars have
discovered that diﬀerent types of services face diﬀerent oﬀshoring costs accord-
ing to their task content (e.g. Garner 2004; Blinder 2006, 2007; Jensen and
Kletzer 2005; Moncarz et al. 2008). For instance, many service occupations,
such as those of general operations managers, still require “proximity” to other
activities performed in the production process and are consequently more dif-
ficult to oﬀshore. In particular, tasks diﬀer in the degree to which they rely
on coordination based on understanding and trust. I propose to proxy these
coordination requirements by building on previous works that have emphasized
the influence of diﬀerent characteristics at the task level on an occupation’s
oﬀshoring costs and to aggregate this information up to the industry level (see
3.2). This work also extends previous empirical works on the country-level de-
terminants of services trade, which find for instance, that cultural distance (e.g.
Kandilov and Grennes 2007; Miroudot et al. 2009; Head et al. 2009) and mutual
membership in free trade agreements (e.g. Kandilov and Grennes 2007) aﬀect
bilateral services trade flows.
My analysis estimates whether and to what extent country characteristics
and the task content of services jointly explain the U.S. service oﬀshoring pat-
tern. The intuitive relationship between task content and country-level deter-
minants of coordination costs is new to the empirical literature and suggests a
more nuanced story regarding the determinants of service oﬀshoring patterns.
The United States oﬀers an especially interesting case for combining these two
strands of research - i.e. the research on country characteristics and on task
1Because OECD data for these two service categories have only been collected since 2005,
I employed data for the largest importer of these service categories (i.e. the United States)
to illustrate the growth of imports since 1995. The United States is also the world’s largest
exporter of these services, and U.S. exports have also almost tripled in real terms from 1995
to 2009. All data are taken from the OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services.
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content - because it is the top service-oﬀshoring country in dollar amount and
because the service sector is especially important in the U.S. economy.2
Methodologically, I build upon the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
estimate a gravity-like equation with interaction terms. Scholars have recently
criticized the traditional approach of employing an OLS estimator in the context
of the standard gravity model. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) as well as West-
erlund and Wilhelmsson (2006) have argued that estimates will be biased and
inconsistent because of the presence of zero-values and heteroscedasticity. After
performing a number of tests to determine the correct estimation technique, I
estimate the gravity equation via zero-inflated Poisson pseudo-maximum likeli-
hood (PPML).
My results indicate that services that depend to a high degree on under-
standing and trust are oﬀshored relatively more to countries that are North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) members, and that have a common
colonial past with the United States. The quality of legal institutions, a common
legal origin, geographic distance, and time zone diﬀerences influence oﬀshoring
patterns identically across all service industries, regardless of their coordination
requirements.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I re-
view the relevant literature on how the interplay between country and industry
characteristics can shape patterns of comparative advantage and extend this
approach to task-specific oﬀshoring costs. Section 3 presents the data and the
calculation of oﬀshoring and coordination proxies. In section 4, I address econo-
metric issues regarding the estimation techniques and present the estimation
results. Section 5 summarizes the findings.
2 Theory and prior empirical research
Which theoretical trade models can guide the empirical analysis of trade pat-
terns across countries and industries? Sharp predictions about trade patterns in
neoclassical trade models, such as the Ricardian model and the Heckscher–Ohlin
model, were traditionally derived in environments restricted to a small number
of countries, goods, and factors. Unfortunately, these sharp results could not
be preserved in settings with higher dimensionality, i.e. many goods and many
countries. As a result, these standard models were diﬃcult to apply to the
data.3
The theoretical basis of my empirical analysis relies on the generalization
2For instance, 25 percent of all U.S. employment occurred in the business service sector in
2007 (see Jensen 2011, p.3f.)
3During the last ten years, the Ricardian trade model has experienced a revival because of
Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) stochastic version of the model. These researchers have developed
a tractable general equilibrium model of international trade with multiple countries and goods
that - unlike most traditional formal trade models - incorporates a role for geography. However,
the Eaton and Kortum framework analyzes aggregate trade volumes rather than industry-level
trade flows. Hence, their contribution oﬀers only limited guidance for the present analysis,
which also seeks to account for the cross-industry variation in oﬀshoring patterns.
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and extension of the sources of comparative advantage developed by Costinot
(2009b). He develops an assignment model on the sources of comparative ad-
vantage that can be applied to diﬀerences in technology and to diﬀerences in
factor endowments. The key concept in his model is log supermodularity, i.e.
a mathematical notion of complementarity that captures the idea that the rel-
ative return to one variable is increasing in another variable. He shows that if
factor productivity across diﬀerent industries is log supermodular with respect
to certain country characteristics γ, e.g. the quality of its financial system, and
to certain industry characteristics σ, e.g. financial requirements, then aggregate
output is also log supermodular. In other words, the productivity of sectors
that have higher financial requirements is relatively more enhanced by a bet-
ter financial system than the productivity of sectors that are less dependent on
the quality of the financial system, i.e. log supermodularity of factor produc-
tivity. As a result, high-γ countries have a comparative advantage in high-σ
industries.4
An emergent literature has provided microfoundations for the concept of
log supermodularity by focusing on institutions. For instance, Costinot (2009a)
assumes that complex products are produced by combining a large number of
tasks and that production consequently requires many contracts with the work-
ers performing the tasks. If the degree to which these contracts are enforced
diﬀers across countries, the products that have high “contractual input intensi-
ties“ (Helpman 2006, p.23) will be relatively more exported from the countries
in which contracts are strictly enforced by the legal system. Nicolini’s (2007)
empirical results support this hypothesis for the cross-country patterns of U.S.
foreign direct investments (FDIs).5
However, in the context of service oﬀshoring, industries do not only diﬀer in
their reliance on institutional quality. In addition to gains from specialization,
the division of labor leads to transaction costs because of the need to coordinate
diﬀerent tasks. Oﬀshoring implies “[...] cost[s] of exchanging information nec-
essary to coordinate various tasks into a single production process,” (Baldwin
and Robert-Nicoud 2010, p.9) i.e. coordination costs. The higher the special-
4More formally, this case represents a Ricardian economy, in which factor productivity sat-
isfies q (ω,σ, γ) = h (ω) a (σ, γ). Where ω are characteristics of multiple factors of production,
which are similarly productive across industries. Now assume that a (σ, γ) is log supermodu-
lar. Thus, if γc1 ≥ γc2 and σs1 ≥ σs2 for any pair of countries c1 and c2 and for any pair of




















In other words, factors in high-γ countries are relatively more productive in high-σ indus-
tries.
5Other empirical papers underpin the importance of “institutional dependence” and “in-
stitutional quality” (Costinot 2009b, p.1166) for the pattern of comparative advantage in the
Ricardian sense, e.g. Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007). Manova (2006) focuses on credit
market imperfections and Cunat and Melitz (2007) on labor market rigidities. See also Ace-
moglu et al. (2007) for a theoretical contribution analyzing how incomplete contracts and
institutional cross-country variation can act as a source of comparative advantage. For a
literature review on the incomplete contracts literature, see Helpman (2006).
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ization of tasks, the more coordination among the specialists is needed for the
production process to work (see Becker and Murphy 1992). With the advent of
oﬀshoring, it became clear that factors other than the degree of fragmentation
influence the amount and type of coordination required. Diﬀerent types of ser-
vices face diﬀerent oﬀshoring costs according to their task content. In particular,
tasks diﬀer in the degree to which they rely on coordination based on under-
standing and trust. As emphasized by Leamer and Storper (2001), transactional
relationships “[...] depend [to diﬀerent degrees] on human relations, involving
combinations of social networks, trust, interpretative communities, and reputa-
tion eﬀects [...].” I propose to proxy these coordination requirements by building
on previous works that have emphasized diﬀerent characteristics at the task level
as influencing an occupation’s oﬀshoring costs and aggregate this information up
to the industry level (see 3.2). Because I focus not on the degree to which indus-
tries diﬀer in their institutional dependence but rather on the degree to which
services require understanding and trust, the set of country characteristics that
could influence the pattern of oﬀshoring shifts accordingly. In addition to the
institutional quality of a country, several other determinants could be important
in enhancing trust and understanding between two countries. I build on pre-
vious empirical works on the determinants of bilateral services trade flows and
consider the linguistic distance between trading partners (e.g. Anderson and
Marcouiller 2002), internet access (e.g. Freund and Weinhold 2002), cultural
distance (e.g. Kandilov and Grennes 2007; Miroudot et al. 2009; Head et al.
2009), origin and quality of legal institutions (e.g. Head et al. 2009), member-
ship in free trade agreements (e.g. Kandilov and Grennes 2007) and diﬀerences
in time zones (e.g. Stein and Daude 2007) as country-level variables. Unlike
these previous analyses, I focus on whether the eﬀects of these country-level
variables diﬀer systematically with the task content of the respective service
category.6 My hypothesis is that if certain country characteristics reduce oﬀ-
shoring costs by enhancing understanding and trust, they are more important
for industries that are highly complex and context-dependent. Hence, the pat-
tern of bilateral service oﬀshoring depends on the interplay between country
characteristics and task content.
3 The Data
To test the hypothesis that U.S. service oﬀshoring patterns depend on the inter-
action between coordination requirements and country characteristics, I need to
6Other empirical contributions on services trade have already shown that the eﬀects of
country-level characteristics, such as time zone diﬀerences, diﬀer across service categories
(e.g. Head et al. 2009). However, I am not aware of any other analysis that has tied these
diﬀerences to the task content of the respective service categories. Oldenski (2012) estimates
the interaction eﬀects between task content and country characteristics to examine the deci-
sion between exports and horizontal FDIs. My work diﬀers from her study by focusing on
oﬀshoring, rather than on modes of serving foreign markets, and by analyzing those task char-
acteristics that were previously emphasized as influencing oﬀshoring costs instead of focusing
on communication and complexity.
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construct several measures that are not directly available in the data. Section 3.1
provides details on the construction of the service oﬀshoring proxy and presents
the first evidence on U.S. service oﬀshoring patterns across countries and in-
dustries. Section 3.2 determines the coordination requirements across diﬀerent
service industries and presents the resulting industry classifications. Section
3.3 describes the country-level characteristics that could influence coordination
costs.
3.1 Oﬀshoring proxy
Oﬀshoring refers to the location rather than to the control over the production
process.7 As illustrated in figure 1, oﬀshoring can take place via foreign direct
investments (FDIs) and via international outsourcing (see e.g. van Welsum and
Vickery 2005; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006; Feenstra 2010, p.5f).
Figure 1: Organization of the production process
Location of production stages






Arms-length Internationaloutsourcing Domestic outsourcing
Source: Author’s illustration adapted from van Welsum and Vickery (2005, p.5) and Feenstra
(2010, p.5)
Unfortunately, no oﬃcial data directly measure the volume of oﬀshoring.
However, oﬀshoring can be measured indirectly. Because the intermediate ser-
vices performed in a foreign country are likely to be imported back to the home
country to be further integrated into the production process of the final good or
service, oﬀshoring can be expected to result in imports of intermediate inputs.8
9
7Much of the recent trade literature analyzes the organizational choices of a global firm
with regard to its boundaries. For a review, see Helpman (2006). In this paper, I will not
address a firm’s decision whether to keep activities in-house or to outsource them. Rather, I
will focus on its decision in which country to locate the activities. This limitation follows not
only from the research focus of this paper, but also from the data limitations. See footnote
13 for further information.
8An intermediate (input) is “[a]n input to production that has itself been produced and
that, unlike capital, is used up in production. As an input, it is in contrast to a primary input,
and as an output, it is in contrast to a final [product].“ (Deardorﬀ 2006, p. 144)
9Feenstra and Hanson (1996) were the first to proxy material oﬀshoring by trade in in-
termediate inputs. I am not the first one to apply this approach to service oﬀshoring. This
approach has already been applied by Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006) and Crinò (2010).
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For the United States, no oﬃcial trade data separate trade in intermediate
inputs from trade in final services.10 By combining two data sources, i.e. input-
output tables with bilateral cross-border services trade data, I can calculate
an oﬀshoring proxy for the United States for diﬀerent oﬀshored services and
distinguish among diﬀerent destination countries. I proceed in two steps.
In a first step, I estimate imported service intermediates. Building on Amiti
and Wei (2005, 2006), the National Academy of Public Administration (2006,
p.57ﬀ.), and the OECD (2007b, p.51f.), I estimate the imported intermediates
of a particular service by multiplying the value of the intermediate purchases of
that service by the ratio of total imports to the total domestic supply of that




TSOst + SIst − SEst
￿
SPst (1)
TSO . . . Total Service Output
SI . . . Service Imports
SE . . . Service Exports
SP . . . Service Purchases
s = 1 . . . S Service
t = 1 . . . T Time
c = 1 . . . C Country
The BEA disaggregates bilateral trade data on total private services for the
United States into travel, passenger fares, other transportation, royalties and
license fees and other private services. I focus on the category of other private
services, which excludes services such as tourism that are not subject to the
oﬀshoring debate and includes services such as management and legal services.12
The other private services category aggregates many heterogeneous activities.
From the year 2006 onwards, the BEA started to publish information by further
decomposing this category for aﬃliated and unaﬃliated trade.13 These data
oﬀer an important improvement over earlier data collections because before
2006, statistics at this detailed level of service categories were only available
for unaﬃliated trade, and, hence, an important aspect of service oﬀshoring had
10For more detailed analyses of the lack of detail available in services trade statistics see the
reports by the U.S. Government Accountability Oﬃce (2004) and by the National Academy
of Public Administration (2006, p.49f.).
11I assume that the import ratio of a certain service is the same irrespective of its use. In
other words, if 10 percent of all financial services are imported, it will be assumed that 10
percent of all intermediate financial services are imported. An OECD report has calculated
the aggregation bias associated with this assumption and the results suggest that the extent
of imported intermediates tends to be biased downwards (Hatzichronoglou 2005, p.13).
12For a similar argument, see also Amiti and Wei (2006), Kandilov and Grennes (2007),
and Head et al. (2009).
13It is not possible to further disentangle this information for aﬃliated and for unaﬃliated
trade. As a result, it is not possible to examine diﬀerent impacts across the two rows of the
column “Foreign country” in figure 1.
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been ignored.14
The level of analysis is determined by the least disaggregated data. Unfor-
tunately, input-output tables provide certain information only at a more aggre-
gate service-category level than bilateral trade data. As a consequence, I can
only calculate an oﬀshoring proxy for the following seven subcategories of the
other private services category: financial services, insurance services, telecom-
munications, computer and information services, legal services, management,
consulting and public relations, and other business, professional, and technical
services. Appendix A provides further descriptions of these subcategories and
additional details on the data sources.
In a second step, I distinguish among diﬀerent destination countries. I follow
Egger and Egger (2003) as well as Miroudot et al. (2009) and weight the im-
ported intermediate services obtained by (1) with the share of service imports
from a certain country c in the worldwide imports of that respective service.
After canceling, this value yields the volume of service oﬀshoring across service




TSOst + SIst − SEst
￿
SIsct (2)
Figures 2 to 4 illustrate the results. Figure 2 shows the variation in oﬀshoring
volumes by service category and shows that in nominal dollar values insurance
services constituted the top oﬀshored service category from 2006 to 2009.
14With U.S. $74.125 millions in 2008, the services supplied within the boundaries of multi-
national companies (MNCs) accounted for almost one-third of the overall imports in other
private services to the United States (in comparison, unaﬃliated services imports accounted
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Figure 2: U.S. service oﬀshoring by service category
Figure 3 shows that this picture changes if I control for the size of the service
industry by normalizing the volume of oﬀshoring with the gross production of
the respective service industry.15 After normalizing, I show that rather than
insurance services, management, consulting and public relations become the
service category whose share of gross production, i.e. roughly five percent, has
been oﬀshored the most over all four years. Although five percent might still be
low, Amiti and Wei (2005) have shown that service oﬀshoring grew rapidly at an
average annual rate of 6.3 percent from 1992 to 2000.16 Service oﬀshoring has
become increasingly important in accounting for overall services trade, i.e. ser-
vices trade in final and intermediate services, and trade in intermediate services
has accounted for roughly 73 percent of overall trade in services in 2006 (see
also Miroudot et al. 2009). As figure 4 shows, the averages over all destination
countries hide significant variation across countries within each service cate-
gory. For instance, computer and information services are mainly oﬀshored to
India, whereas legal services are mainly oﬀshored to Great Britain and Canada.
This heterogeneous cross-country pattern across service categories motivates the
present analysis.
15For details, see equation (6) in appendix A. This normalization also considers the concern
that during the sample period gross production of financial services could have been distorted
due to the financial crisis.
16Before the mid-1990s oﬀshoring primarily concerned manufacturing activities, and the
scale of service oﬀshoring was close to zero (see e.g. Crinò 2009). In contrast to service
oﬀshoring, the estimates by the OECD (2007a, p.111ﬀ.) suggest that the growth rate of
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Figure 4: U.S. service oﬀshoring as a share of gross production per service across
countries and services in 2006
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3.2 Coordination requirements
Another diﬃculty in testing the joint impact of coordination requirements and
country-level characteristics stems from the fact that coordination requirements
at the industry level are not observable in the data. Therefore, I construct a
proxy for a service industry’s coordination requirements by employing the clas-
sification provided in Moncarz et al. (2008).17 They report the results of a
classification scheme developed by more than 20 economists from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) Employment Projections Program. I decided to employ
the ranking developed by Moncarz et al. (2008) for two reasons. First, instead
of emphasizing one particular task characteristic, their ranking is very compre-
hensive. It is based on the characteristics of occupations that were emphasized
to diﬀerent degrees by several other contributions as influencing the costs of oﬀ-
shoring (e.g. Bardhan and Kroll 2003; Garner 2004; Jensen and Kletzer 2005;
van Welsum and Vickery 2005; Blinder 2006). The common insight of these con-
tributions is that the task content of diﬀerent occupations aﬀects the costs of
oﬀshoring, regardless of the country to which they are oﬀshored. Second, unlike
most of the other contributions, Moncarz et al. have established a continuous
ranking of a task’s oﬀshorability. A dichotomy that instead classifies tasks as
either oﬀshorable or non-oﬀshorable would not be useful in the present analysis
because I am interested in the diﬀerences in oﬀshoring costs within the group
of oﬀshorable tasks.18
The economists of the BLS Employment Projections Program proceeded as
follows. First, they identified 355 of the 515 service occupations in the Standard
Occupational Classification System (SOC)19 as non-tradable. The occupations
that were classified as non-tradable include those services that require face-to-
face contact with customers (e.g. barbers) or need to be performed in a fixed
location (e.g. security guards). In a second step, the economists assigned all
other service occupations an “oﬀshoring susceptibility“ score,20 which depends
on the degree to which they comply with diﬀerent criteria. In the following, I
explain for which coordination requirements this “susceptibility” score serves as
a proxy.
Some tasks inherently require more coordination than other tasks. For in-
stance, managers have to stay in contact with the diﬀerent departments of a
firm, whereas computer programmers only interact with parts of the firm. Levy
and Murnane (2006) argue that routine occupations are typically the easiest
ones to oﬀshore because they are easy to explain and easy to monitor.21 In
17Note that the resulting proxy has an ordinal rather than a cardinal scale.
18The only other continuous ranking thus far is the one developed by Blinder (2007).
19For further details, see appendix B.
20Note that one has to be careful when using the term “oﬀshoring susceptibility”. The
actual pattern of oﬀshoring depends on both the potential costs and the potential benefits,
which are not considered in this ranking. Furthermore, as argued in the present analysis, the
actual costs also depend on the interplay between task content and country characteristics.
The classification by Moncarz et al. (2008) ranks tasks according to their inherent oﬀshoring
costs.
21Moncarz et al. (2008) address this issue with the following two questions: “[...] To what
degree do the duties of this occupation require interaction with other types of workers?” and
11
the context of the literature on institutions and trade, this finding has been
interpreted as indicating the degree to which tasks rely on successful contract
enforcement. However, “easy” also means that there are fewer prerequisites nec-
essary for a successful exchange of information. Leamer and Storper (2001)
argue that once people have acquired the underlying symbol systems (e.g. lan-
guage and mathematical skills), these symbols can be used to communicate the
required information and instructions as well as to monitor the results of rou-
tine tasks and tasks that are based on codifiable information. As a result, these
tasks can be easily conveyed at a distance. On the contrary, complex, tacit
information cannot be transmitted solely through the acquisition of the respec-
tive symbol system. Successful performance requires mutual understanding and
trust because some information is context-dependent. For instance, many mar-
keting occupations may not be performed very successfully without familiarity
with the target market.22
Based on the compliance with these criteria, the BLS economists ranked
each of the service occupations. By using the information provided in the
industry-specific occupational employment and wage estimates of the BLS,23
I can aggregate the occupation-level information24 provided in Moncarz et al.
(2008) up to the service-category level. This aggregation is necessary because
the oﬀshoring proxy is calculated at the service-industry level according to the
NAICS categories (see 3.1). More specifically, I calculate a weighted average for
each of the seven service categories by weighting the oﬀshoring score for each
occupation o with the share of occupational employment in total employment






I normalize this industry-level score in such a way that it lies between zero
“[...] To what degree can the work of the occupation be routinized or handled by following a
script?” (Moncarz et al. 2008, p.75)
22Moncarz et al. (2008) consider two diﬀerent criteria. “[...] To what degree can the inputs
and outputs of the occupation be transmitted electronically, or otherwise be easily and cheaply
transported?” and “[...] To what degree is knowledge of social and cultural idiosyncrasies, or
other local knowledge, of the target market needed to carry out the tasks of this occupation?”
(Moncarz et al. 2008, p.75)
23Publicly accessible at the BLS website.
24This level of analysis is important because some occupations are tradable even though
they are performed for industries whose final products would be categorized as non-tradable
(see also Jensen and Kletzer 2005).
25Even if oﬀshoring does not necessarily imply layoﬀs of workers in the home country, it can
still change relative employment and hence the occupational composition within industries
such that using older data would have been preferable in this context. Derimoglu gives an
example that helps to illustrate this point: “[...] consider a firm that expands its back oﬃce
jobs by hiring abroad rather than in the United States — that expansion would not displace
U.S. workers, but it would be a case of oﬀshoring, as the firm substitutes production abroad
for its production in the United States“ (Derimoglu 2006, p.5). However, the year 2003 is
the first year for which information on occupational employment is based on the 2002 NAICS
coding structure. This feature renders the data compatible with the classification utilized in
the trade data and in the input-output data.
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and one, with one indicating the lowest susceptibility to oﬀshoring and zero in-
dicating the highest oﬀshoring susceptibility. Figure 6 shows the resulting clas-
sification across the seven service categories. Insurance services are classified as
the most prone to oﬀshoring, whereas management, consulting, and public rela-
tions are the least susceptible to oﬀshoring. Hence, this ranking indicates that
management, consulting, and public relations have the highest requirements
for coordination based on understanding and trust, whereas insurance services
depend the least on these prerequisites.









Figure 5: Oﬀshoring score per service category
3.3 Country-level determinants
By requiring more prerequisites, the task content described in 3.2 influences the
costs that arise from the fragmentation of the production process, regardless of
whether this fragmentation takes place within or across country borders. In the
context of oﬀshoring, this fragmentation can incur extra costs because it occurs
across international borders. Several country-level variables have been found to
influence the bilateral volume of services trade. Rather than concentrating on
production or transport costs, I focus on the characteristics that could influence
the coordination costs26 between the home and destination countries. Follow-
ing previous empirical works, I concentrate on the following set of country-level
determinants: common language, cultural similarity, FTA membership, geo-
26Production costs are aﬀected, for instance, by the productivity-adjusted wages in the
destination country.
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graphic distance, internet penetration, common legal origins, quality of legal
institutions, and diﬀerences in time zones. In the following, I explain in more
detail how each of these characteristics could influence the coordination costs for
services that are highly complex and context-dependent. Table 1 summarizes
the expected signs of the eﬀect of each country-level variable.27
Crémer et al. (2007) have argued that communication and thus coordina-
tion are easier within firms because they have developed a common “language“
and share common norms and values. Accordingly, coordination failures can
be expected to be less frequent if people speak the same language and fewer
misunderstandings occur as a result. Head et al.’s (2009) results suggest that
countries sharing a common language tend to have higher bilateral services trade
flows.
Even if the populations of the two countries do not speak the same language,
citizens can be familiar with the cultural idiosyncrasies of the other country.
Familiarity can be expected to go hand in hand with higher levels of trust and
understanding, which, in turn, facilitate coordination. Unlike the results for
goods trade, the results for services trade have not yet provided clear evidence
regarding the impact of past colonial ties as a proxy for cultural similarity (see
e.g. Kandilov and Grennes 2007; Head et al. 2009).
I also include a dummy variable for the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA). Even if FTAs are designed to enhance goods trade, the result-
ing intensified trade relationships could also facilitate coordination via a greater
familiarity with local conditions. In line with this argument, Kandilov and
Grennes (2007) as well as Manning et al. (2009) have provided evidence that
mutual membership in a free trade agreement positively impacts the volume of
services trade between two countries.28
Many scholars argue that geographic distance does not have a significant im-
pact on service oﬀshoring. Because services are transported electronically, the
transport costs for services – unlike those for goods – do not depend on the
geographic distance over which the service is transmitted (e.g. Blinder 2006).29
In this context, it is important to emphasize that I focus on a diﬀerent chan-
nel through which country characteristics influence oﬀshoring patterns. Rather
than concentrating on transport costs, I focus on coordination costs. Because
travel costs tend to be higher over long distances, people tend to have fewer
travel experiences, and geographic distance can proxy for unfamiliarity (see e.g.
Grossman 1996). For instance, the first instances of service oﬀshoring occurred
among trading partners that were geographically relatively close to each other.30
27For details on the data sources and the construction of these country-level variables, see
appendix C.
28A common border dummy is another control often included in gravity equations. However,
because I only consider the United States as the oﬀshoring country, the NAFTA dummy is
identical to a common border dummy.
29Accordingly, Kandilov and Grennes (2007) find that geographic distance has no explana-
tory power for services trade after controlling for the eﬀect of networks, such as internet
penetration and telephone call traﬃc among trading partners.
30An early instance of service oﬀshoring was the oﬀshoring of design tasks to Germany by
the British motor industry in 1979 (see Amiti and Wei 2004).
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Accordingly, Head et al. (2009) find evidence that geographic distance nega-
tively aﬀects the volume of services trade.
Developments in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), such
as the emergence of the Internet and the World Wide Web during the 1980s and
1990s, have significantly reduced the costs of the almost real-time transmission
of instructions and information.31 The security of these data transmissions has
also been enhanced by the increasing use of encrypted private networks, such
as virtual private networks (VPN) (e.g. GAO 2004, p.10f.). As Freund and
Weinhold (2002) have shown, internet penetration has a strong positive eﬀect
on trade in services (see also Kandilov and Grennes 2007). However, as Leamer
and Storper (2001) have argued, whether enhanced internet penetration will
lead to higher trust or understanding is less clear. Hence, I do not expect the
positive eﬀect of ICTs to diﬀer according to the coordination requirements of
the respective service industries.
According to the incomplete contracts literature mentioned above, and em-
pirical results e.g. by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), the quality of the legal
system enhances the security of contract enforcement, property rights etc. Fur-
thermore, a similar legal system reduces the cost of gathering information about
the relevant rules in the partner country. Both characteristics could enhance
formal trust (see e.g. Anderson 2000, Huang 2007) and thereby facilitate coor-
dination.
In addition to these characteristics, time zone diﬀerences could also impact
coordination costs. On the one hand, time zone diﬀerences can lead to oﬀ-
shoring benefits because they oﬀer the possibility of providing certain services,
such as call centers, around the clock (“continuity eﬀect“). On the other hand,
time zone diﬀerences complicate real-time communication during business hours
(“synchronization eﬀect“; see Head et al. 2009, p.435) and thus hamper coordi-
nation. Hence, the overall eﬀect is not clear, and previous works have not yet
found clear evidence on this matter (see e.g. Head et al. 2009).






quality of legal institutions -
common legal origins -
time zone diﬀerence + / -
31The significant growth of the global telecommunications infrastructure in 1990 was facili-
tated by the immense investments in fiberoptic cables during the dot-com boom. In particular,
the bust in 2001 has enabled many – also developing – countries to use these networks almost
for free and thus gave another boost to oﬀshoring (see e.g. U.S. Government Accountability
Oﬃce 2004, p.10; Derimoglu 2006).
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4 Econometric analysis
I estimate variants of the following equation to examine the joint impact of
country-level characteristics and coordination requirements on U.S. service oﬀ-
shoring patterns:
OFFsct = exp (c+ βXs ∗ Zc + γZc + δXs + di + εsct) (4)
s = 1 . . . S Service
t = 1 . . . T T ime
c = 1 . . . C Country
OFFsct is the volume of U.S. service oﬀshoring to country c, divided by the
gross production in service industry s in year t. I perform this normalization to
make the coeﬃcient comparable across industries and to account for industry
size. Xs is the proxy for the coordination requirements of service industry s,
Zc is a vector of country characteristics, Xs ∗Zc is a set of interactions between
diﬀerent country characteristics and the coordination requirement proxy, and di
is a set of time and/or country fixed eﬀects.32
Equation (4) resembles a gravity equation.33 Usually, scholars employ grav-
ity equations to estimate the eﬀects of diﬀerent country characteristics on bi-
lateral trade flows. The present analysis addresses the diﬀerential impact of
country characteristics across service categories that is of interest, i.e. the coef-
ficient β on the interactions.34 An example will help to illustrate this idea. The
country-level variables that are assumed to aﬀect communication costs include
cultural similarity. If the origin and destination countries share certain norms
and values, these shared attributes will facilitate communication and thus coor-
dination between the countries. As a consequence, I expect cultural similarity to
have a positive eﬀect on the expected volume of service oﬀshoring. Depending
on the specification, this positive impact across all services is captured by either
the coeﬃcient γc or the country fixed eﬀect. In addition, I expect the impact of
cultural similarity to be particularly strong for those services that have higher
requirements for coordination based on understanding and trust, e.g. complex
services. Because the oﬀshoring susceptibility score rankings are proxying for
increasing coordination requirements, a positive coeﬃcient β on the interaction
term would support this idea.
32Because my proxy of coordination requirements is collinear with service industry fixed
eﬀects, these eﬀects are excluded.
33Gravity models predict that the volumes of bilateral trade flows depend upon “centrifugal“
and “centripetal forces“ (Baldwin and Venables 2010, p.3) that diﬀer across trading partners.
For a recent survey of the theoretical foundations and specifications, see Baldwin and Taglioni
(2006).
34Interaction terms were first included into a gravity equation by Rajan and Zingales (1998)
in their analysis of the joint impact of financial development and financial requirements on
industry growth. More recently, e.g. Levchenko (2007) and Chor (2010) have developed similar
functional forms to estimate the interplay between country and industry characteristics on the
pattern of trade.
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4.1 Discussion of estimation methods
In the following paragraphs, I present the dataset and examine the appropriate-
ness of diﬀerent estimators that have been discussed in the recent turn in the
scholarly discourse towards the challenges of the econometric estimation of the
gravity model.35
Traditionally, scholars have estimated multiplicative models, such as the
gravity equation, by taking the logarithm to transform these models into an
additive form before employing an OLS estimator. However, this estimation
approach suﬀers from two flaws. First, it cannot handle data that are rich in
zero-value observations because the logarithm is not defined for non-positive
values. As a consequence, many previous empirical studies have dropped the
zero-value observations (e.g. Levchenko 2007; Chor 2010). However, these zero
observations36 also depend on the regressors because they are more likely to
occur, for instance, for distant countries. Thus, dropping the zero-value obser-
vations implies a selection bias because the sample is no longer random (see e.g.
Westerlund and Wilhelmsson 2006).37
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) emphasize a second problem. Even under
the assumption that the dependent variable only takes on positive values, an
OLS estimation of the logarithmic transformation has to address the problem
of inherent heteroscedasticity, which can lead to inconsistent estimates. Even if
the mean of the error term in the original model is independent of the regressors,
if heteroscedasticity is present, the expected value of the logarithm of the error
term is a function of the covariates because the expected value of the logarithm
of a random variable also depends on its higher-order moments, such as the
variance (see also Winkelmann 2008, p.97ﬀ.).38
As a solution to both problems, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose
to directly estimate the multiplicative form of the model with a Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. The basic Poisson regression model
assumes a conditional Poisson distribution for the dependent variable. In other
words, the density of the dependent variable is determined entirely by the con-
ditional mean because the conditional variance and mean are assumed to be
equal such that E (y |x ) = V (y |x ). However, the Poisson estimators are con-
35The recent focus on econometric issues was initiated byAnderson and van Wincoop’s
(2003) claim that the traditional gravity equation has been misspecified because it only con-
siders absolute measures as regressors and does not control for relative ones. They suggest
augmenting it by introducing multilateral resistance terms, which are often proxied by re-
moteness indices. As has been shown by Feenstra (2004, p.161ﬀ.), an alternative approach
that also leads to consistent estimates is to introduce exporter and importer fixed eﬀects.
36Trade values will also be registered as zero observations if they do not reach a certain
minimum value, which is U.S. $500,000 for the United States.
37According to the Monte Carlo simulations conducted by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006),
other procedures will also lead to inconsistent and biased estimators to diﬀerent degrees. These
approaches include the use of a Tobit estimator (e.g. Felbermayer and Kohler 2004) and the
replacement of Ysct = 0 with Ysct + 1, , which is followed by the estimation with OLS (e.g.
Nicolini 2007).
38Santos Silva’s and Tenreyro’s (2006) illustration focuses on the gravity model but their
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sistent even if the dependent variable is not a count variable and the underlying
distribution is not Poisson. According to maximum likelihood theory, for the
estimator to be consistent, the conditional mean of the dependent variable needs
to be correctly specified by a distribution belonging to the linear exponential
family, i.e. E [yi |x ] = exp (xiβ) (see e.g. Gourieroux et al. 1984). Plotting the
empirical and theoretical density probabilities in figure 6, I find that the expo-
nential distribution seems to describe the data well. Another advantage oﬀered
by the exponential distribution is that it accounts for the fact that oﬀshoring
flows can be zero but not negative.
A potential problem is that the data exhibit overdispersion (i.e. the mean is
smaller than the variance). Hence, the assumption that the conditional variance
is proportional to the conditional mean is violated. As a result, the standard
errors will be downward biased, and z-values will be misleadingly large and p-
values misleadingly small (see Long and Freese 2006, p.376). Overdispersion
maybe addressed through the application of a negative binomial model (NB).39
In this case, the variance depends not only on the conditional mean, but also on a
dispersion parameter. Whether the Poisson or the negative binomial regression
model is a better fit to the data can be tested by applying a likelihood ratio
test for overdispersion. If the dispersion parameter alpha is zero, the NB model
reduces to the Poisson model (see Cameron and Trivedi 2010, p.577ﬀ.; Long
and Freese 2006, p.407ﬀ.). This case applies to the present analysis, and there
is no significant evidence of overdispersion (G2= 3.3e - 05, p = 0.498).40
Another problem I could encounter are “excess” zeroes (i.e. there would be
39Santos Silva and Tenreyro suggest basing inferences on Eicker-White robust standard
errors to solve this problem.
40The likelihood ratio test statistic is based on the diﬀerence between the two log-likelihood
values; the distribution is a mixture of a chi-squared distribution with no degrees of freedom
and a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom (see Winkelmann 2008, p.113f.).
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more zero observations than would be predicted by a Poisson model).41 This
problem can be addressed by applying zero-inflated models, such as the zero-
inflated Poisson model (ZIP). Zero-inflated models are based on the assumption
that zero observations can result from two diﬀerent data generating processes.
In the inflated part of the regression model the eﬀects on the probability of
observing zero oﬀshoring volumes are estimated by a logit model, P (y = 0
|x ). This probability may depend e.g. on geographic distance but also on
other factors, such as trade embargoes, that do not influence the volume of
oﬀshoring. Then, in a second step, the impact of the regressors on the volume
of oﬀshoring (which can also be zero) is estimated by a Poisson model for all
observations that have a non-zero probability of oﬀshoring (see Cameron and
Trivedi 2010, p.599ﬀ.). In other words, also countries that are not receiving any
oﬀshored services in a certain year or a certain service category are included in
this sample because they could potentially have obtained oﬀshored services.42
As a result, the eﬀects of the regressors are allowed to diﬀer for oﬀshoring flows
that have a zero probability and for those that have a non-zero probability
of oﬀshoring. To compare the standard Poisson model and the zero-inflated
regression model, I employ the Vuong test. Under the null hypothesis that
the probability of being in the “always zero” group is zero, the test statistic has
an asymptotic standard normal distribution. Large positive values indicate that
the zero-inflated version is more appropriate, whereas large negative values favor
the standard model (see e.g. Long and Freese 2006, p.408f.). The Vuong test
shows that the zero-inflated Poisson regression is a better fit for the data than
the standard Poisson model (z-value of 34.29). As a result of the diﬀerent tests
performed, I estimate equation (4) via a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression
model.43
4.2 Estimation results
This section examines the estimation results for the ZIP regression. Table 2
reports the estimates of equation (4), with column (1) presenting the baseline
results. The results in column (2) are based on clustered standard errors at the
country level, and column (3) presents the preferred specification.44
41According to Greene (1994), excess zeroes can “masquerade” as overdispersion, and it is
important to disentangle both problems because diﬀerent methods can address them. In other
words, even if the negative binomial model can deal with the problem of overdispersion due
to unobserved heterogeneity, unlike zero-inflated models, it assumes the same data generating
process for zero observations and hence does not control for unobserved heterogeneity across
zero observations.
42More precisely, zero-inflated models allow for two types of zeroes (unlike hurdle models,
which allow for only one type of zero). See Winkelmann (2008, p.188ﬀ.). See also Burger et
al. (2009) for a recent overview of these estimation techniques in the context of the gravity
equation.
43The ZIP and the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) are nested, so that both models
can be compared by applying a likelihood-ratio test. The results from this test can be obtained
upon request and also provide evidence for preferring the ZIP over the ZINB.
44The regression results for the inflated part of the ZIP regression are suppressed because
none of the regressors is statistically significant at any of the conventional levels. These results
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Table 2: Zero-inflated Poisson regression
(1) (2) (3)
ZIP ZIP ZIP
Oﬀshorability score -25.88*** -25.88 -33.06*
(7.732) (16.91) (15.96)
Skill intensity 1.234 1.234 1.047
(0.750) (1.348) (1.309)
Skill endowment 0.0596 0.0596 -0.0873
(0.527) (1.087) (1.100)
*skill intensity -1.063 -1.063 -0.784
(0.828) (1.599) (1.425)
Rule of law 7.125*** 7.125 6.317
(1.364) (3.870) (3.935)
*oﬀshorability score -2.149 -2.149
(1.751) (2.321)
Common legal origin 0.788** 0.788 0.588
(0.264) (0.614) (0.415)
*oﬀshorability score -0.431 -0.431
(0.521) (0.797)
Common language 0.307 0.307 0.462
(0.252) (0.562) (0.599)
*oﬀshorability score -0.911 -0.911 -1.370
(0.571) (0.899) (1.085)
colonial past 0.939** 0.939 0.896
(0.331) (0.572) (0.593)
*oﬀshorability score 2.043** 2.043* 2.343*
(0.710) (0.975) (0.959)
NAFTA -3.463* -3.463 -3.682
(1.700) (4.118) (3.891)





*oﬀshorability score 9.796*** 9.796* 11.06**
(2.130) (4.482) (4.240)
Time zone diﬀerences 0.276** 0.276 0.294
(0.0855) (0.248) (0.235)
*oﬀshorability score -0.0521 -0.0521 -0.0910
(0.131) (0.309) (0.290)
log(Geographic distance) -2.334** -2.334 -2.489
(0.711) (1.913) (1.812)
*oﬀshorability score 3.090** 3.090 3.703
(0.942) (2.113) (1.986)
Internet penetration 0.000607 0.000607 0.000596
(0.000509) (0.000932) (0.000765)
*oﬀshorability score -0.000185 -0.000185
(0.00114) (0.00136)
log(GDP per capita) -0.153 -0.153 -0.160
(0.219) (0.619) (0.606)
Fixed eﬀects Year Year Year
Observations 3724 3724 3724
Log pseudolikelihood -4.6577169 -4.657717 -4.661246
Columns (1): Robust standard errors in parentheses;
Columns (2) and (3): Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
One obvious concern is that the estimates of equation (4) could be biased
because of omitted variables. Hence, in addition to the variables of interest, I
include control variables for alternative determinants of the service oﬀshoring
patterns that could be correlated with (parts of) the interaction terms. In
particular, I include a proxy for skill intensity at the industry level, a proxy
for skill endowments at the country level,45 their interaction term, and a wage
45One limitation of the present analysis is the assumption that coordination costs depend
solely on the characteristics of tasks and countries. Hence, workers are assumed to be ho-
mogeneous in their coordination skills. This assumption is due to the fact that there is no
available measure of cross-country coordination and hence communication skills. Because skill
is not a unidimensional concept, general skill endowments do not necessarily oﬀer information
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proxy, i.e. GDP per capita.46
The result in column (1) of table 2 implies that an increase in the oﬀshoring
susceptibility score decreases the expected share of oﬀshoring. This finding sug-
gests that an increase in the oﬀshoring susceptibility score indicates an increase
in oﬀshoring costs. As argued in 3.2, these oﬀshoring costs are driven by higher
coordination requirements. This result is also economically significant in magni-
tude and indicates, ceteris paribus, that for a one standard deviation increase in
the oﬀshoring susceptibility score, roughly 0.29, the expected share of oﬀshoring
decreases by roughly 99 percent.
In line with previous findings, I find that the higher the quality of a country’s
legal environment, as measured by the Kaufman et al. (2009) rule of law index,
the higher is the expected share of oﬀshored services that a country attracts.
This result is significant at the 1 percent level. With respect to the magnitude
of this eﬀect, the ZIP specification in column (1) suggests that a one standard
deviation increase in the quality of legal institutions, roughly 0.21, increases the
expected share of oﬀshoring by a factor of 4.46.
Similar to the quality of legal institutions, a common legal origin (i.e. UK
legal origins), a common colonial past, and time zone diﬀerences positively aﬀect
the expected service oﬀshoring flows from the United States, whereas geographic
distance and being a member of NAFTA decrease the expected oﬀshoring flows.
The coeﬃcients on the common language dummy and on internet penetration
are not statistically significant at any of the conventional levels.
Let us now focus on the discussion of the results regarding the interaction
eﬀects. The coeﬃcients on the respective interaction terms with the coordina-
tion proxy are not statistically significant at any of the conventional levels for
the following variables: the quality of legal institutions, a common legal ori-
gin (i.e. UK legal origins), a common language, internet penetration, and time
zone diﬀerences. This finding does not imply that these variables do not aﬀect
oﬀshoring; it only suggests that they do not significantly aﬀect the relative oﬀ-
shoring shares of services that are characterized by a high degree of complexity
and context-dependency. Put diﬀerently, regardless of the task content of the
respective service, these country-level characteristics aﬀect the expected share
of oﬀshoring in the same way.
The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms with the NAFTA dummy, the com-
mon colonial past dummy and geographic distance are all positive and statisti-
cally significant at least at the five percent level. I further test for robustness
of these interaction eﬀects. First, I base the inference in the Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood regression on clustered standard errors at the country level.
on communication skills. For instance, an OECD (2000) survey has identified and measured
three diﬀerent dimensions of literacy across 20 countries, i.e. prose literacy, document literacy
and quantitative literacy. In 2013, the new results of a more comprehensive OECD survey will
be published (see OECD 2009). These results will oﬀer an interesting extension to the present
analysis. One could imagine analyzing the interaction eﬀects between these more detailed skill
endowments of a country and the task content.
46Skill endowments are measured by the average years of tertiary schooling in a country,
and skill intensity is measured by the share of college graduates in the overall employment of
an industry. See appendix C for additional details on the data sources.
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Column (2) in table 2 shows the results. The results regarding the interaction
eﬀects of NAFTA and a common colonial past are robust to this additional
control, whereas the interaction eﬀect with geographic distance loses statistical
significance. Second, I estimate a ZIP regression with clustered standard er-
rors without those interaction eﬀects that were not significantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 10 percent significance level. Column (3) presents the results and
shows that the interaction eﬀects with the NAFTA dummy and the colonial
past dummy are, again, robust to this alternative estimation.47 Let us now
turn towards the economic interpretation of these interaction eﬀects, in which
we focus on the results in column (3).48
A common colonial past increases the expected share of oﬀshoring (see col-
umn (1)). The positive and significant interaction term suggests that this eﬀect
is even stronger for those services with a relatively high degree of coordination
requirements. As past colonial ties proxy for cultural similarity, this result is
consistent with expectations. A higher cultural familiarity enhances trust and
understanding and is especially important for exchanges of information that re-
lies primarily on mutual understanding. With respect to economic magnitude,
let us focus on two services, i.e. management and consulting services as well as
financial services, and on two countries, i.e. the United Kingdom and Germany.
These two industries and countries oﬀer special cases for which the calculation
of the economic magnitude is easily illustrated. The reason for this is that
the common colonial dummy is one for the United Kingdom and zero for Ger-
many, and, similarly, the oﬀshoring susceptibility is zero for financial services
as compared to one for management/consulting services. The coeﬃcient on the
interaction term in column (3) implies that, ceteris paribus, the oﬀshoring flows
of management and consulting services (relative to financial services) are higher
in the United Kingdom than in Germany by a factor of 10.41.49
The NAFTA dummy has a diﬀerential impact depending on the service in-
dustry’s task content. For the services that rely the least on understanding
and trust, the expected share of oﬀshoring is lower for Canada and Mexico (see
column (1)). For those services that require more prerequisites for successful co-
ordination, the expected share of oﬀshoring increases for NAFTA countries. One
economic interpretation is that for highly complex, context-dependent services,
47Table 10 in appendix D shows the results for the stepwise deletion of insignificant variables.
Note that the interaction terms with NAFTA and common colonial past are statistically
significant in each of these steps.
48Unfortunately, the zero-inflated Poisson regression cannot yet be extended to a fixed-eﬀect
estimator (see Winkelmann 2008, p. 227). However, the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
estimator can be extended to a fixed-eﬀect Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator (see
Westerlund and Wilhelmson 2006). To further check the robustness of the interaction eﬀects
with regard to potential unobserved country heterogeneity, I also performed a fixed-eﬀect
Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood regression. The interaction eﬀects are, again, statistically
significant and have the same signs. The economic magnitude is similar, but slightly smaller.
Results are available upon request from the author.










oﬀshoring costs also depend on smooth communication and understanding, and
the respective coordination is easier with those countries either because of the
experiences already gained in previous trade relations or because these countries
have a common border with the United States. Note that I cannot disentangle
these two reasons because they are perfectly collinear in the present analysis.
The result in column (3) implies that, ceteris paribus, for a one standard devi-
ation increase in the coordination proxy, service oﬀshoring flows are higher in
Canada than in Germany by a factor of 24.71.50
5 Conclusion
Service oﬀshoring is currently one of the most dynamic and heatedly debated
aspects of international trade in both academia and politics. However, because
of data limitations, few empirical studies have examined trade in services. This
paper oﬀers new evidence on the determinants of U.S. service oﬀshoring by
matching data on the task content of service industries with bilateral services
trade data and input-output data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The intuitive relationship between coordination requirements based on the
task content and country-level determinants of services trade is new to the em-
pirical literature and oﬀers insights on the mechanism through which country
characteristics aﬀect oﬀshoring patterns. Much of the recent literature in in-
ternational trade and in labor economics has argued that oﬀshoring costs diﬀer
across services according to their task content. By employing disaggregated
trade data for the United States, I was able to analyze the interplay between
task characteristics and characteristics at the country level. This interplay led
to oﬀshoring patterns that diﬀer across countries and across services. In par-
ticular, I have focused on how this interplay influences coordination costs based
on understanding and trust.
The present results suggest that the interaction between task characteristics
and country characteristics is important to the eﬀects of a common colonial
past, and of a membership in NAFTA. These interaction eﬀects are robust
to the control for unobservable country heterogeneity. This evidence extends
previous empirical works on the country-level determinants of service oﬀshoring
and suggests a more nuanced story. A better quality of legal institutions, a
common legal origin, geographic distance, and time zone diﬀerences influence
oﬀshoring patterns identically across all service industries, regardless of their
coordination requirements.
Many scholars have argued that services will become increasingly tradable
because of technological progress. These scholars argue that technological change
50Nunn (2007) emphasizes that there could be reverse causal influence, i.e. the pattern
of specialization influences institutional features, such as the quality of legal institutions.
Hence, he replaces his measure of institutional quality with an instrument, i.e. legal origin,
that cannot be aﬀected by the pattern of trade. However, in the present analysis, the country
characteristics in the interaction terms of interest are such, that they are unlikely to be aﬀected
by the pattern of oﬀshoring, with the exception of IT infrastructure.
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enables the cheaper transmission of ever more data (e.g. Blinder 2007). In con-
trast, some evidence suggests that the task content of service occupations has
become more complex over time (e.g. Spitz-Oener 2006). The present analysis
shows that this type of service in particular relies on understanding and trust,
which for the United States are enhanced by its past colonial ties, and a mem-
bership in NAFTA. These findings shed doubt on the prediction that the spread
of ICTs is automatically leading to an increasingly flat world for trade flows of
services.
Data availability limits the scope of the required disaggregated analysis to
the United States. Because we can expect bilateral trade datasets to become
increasingly available at the level of detailed industries, future works should try
to extend the present analysis to a broader set of oﬀshoring countries.
References
[1] Acemoglu, A., Antràs, P., & Helpman, E. (2007). Contracts and Technology
Adoption. American Economic Review, 97(3), 916-943.
[2] Amiti, M., & Wei, S.-J. (2005). Service Oﬀshoring, Productivity, and Em-
ployment: Evidence from the United States. IMF Working Paper, 05(238).
[3] Amiti, M., &Wei, S.-J. (2006). Does Service Oﬀshoring Lead to Job Losses?
Evidence from the United States. Mimeo.
[4] Anderson, J. E. (1979). A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Model.
American Economic Review, 69(1), 106-116.
[5] Anderson, J. E. (2000). Why Do Nations Trade (so Little)? Pacific Eco-
nomic Review, 5(2), 115-134.
[6] Anderson, J. E., & Marcouiller, D. (2002). Insecurity and the Pattern of
Trade: An Empirical Investigation. Review of Economics and Statistics,
84, 342-352.
[7] Anderson, J. E., & van Wincoop, E. (2003). Gravity with Gravitas: a
Solution to the Border Puzzle. American Economic Review, 93(1), 170-
192.
[8] Baldwin, R., & Robert-Nicoud, F. (2010). Trade-in-Goods and Trade-in-
Tasks: An Integrating Framework. NBER Working Paper (No. 15882).
[9] Baldwin, R., & Venables, A. J. (2010). Relocating the Value Chain: Oﬀ-
shoring and Agglomeration in the Global Economy. NBER Working Paper
(No. 16611).
[10] Bardhan, A. D., & Kroll, C. (2003). The New Wave of Outsourcing. Work-
ing Paper, Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics, University
of California Berkeley (No. 1103).
25
[11] Blinder, A. S. (2006a). Oﬀshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution? For-
eign Aﬀairs, 85(2), 112-128.
[12] Blinder, A. S. (2007). How Many U.S. jobs might be Oﬀshorable? Princeton
University Center for Economic Policy Studies Working Paper (No. 142).
[13] Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2001). Report on the American Workforce
2001: U.S. Department of Labor.
[14] Burger, M. J., Oort, F. G. v., & Linders, G.-J. M. (2009). On the Specifica-
tion of the Gravity Model of Trade: Zeros, Excess Zeros and Zero-Inflated
Estimation. Spatial Economic Analysis, 4(2), 167-190.
[15] Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2010). Microeconometrics Using Stata
(second ed.). College Station, Texas: Stata Press.
[16] Chor, D. (2010). Unpacking Sources of Comparative Advantage: A Quan-
titative Approach. Journal of International Economics, 82, 152-167.
[17] Costinot, A. (2009a). On the Origins of Comparative Advantage. Journal
of International Economics, 77, 255-264.
[18] Costinot, A. (2009b). An Elementary Theory of Comparative Advantage.
Econometrica, 77(4), 1165-1192.
[19] Crémer, J., Garicano, L., & Prat, A. (2007). Language and the Theory of
the Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 373-407.
[20] Crinò, R. (2009a). Oﬀshoring, Multinationals and Labour Market: A Re-
view of the Empirical Literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(2), 197-
249.
[21] Crinò, R. (2010). Service oﬀshoring and white-collar employment. Review
of Economic Studies, 77(2), 595-632.
[22] Cunat, A., & Melitz, M. (2007). Volatility, Labor Market Flexibility and
teh Pattern of Comparative Advantage. NBERWorking Paper (No. 13062).
[23] Deardorﬀ, A. V. (2006). Terms of Trade: Glossary of International Eco-
nomics. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.
[24] Demiroglu, U. (2006). Oﬀshoring of Service Jobs. Munich Personal RePEc
Archive - MPRA Paper (No. 17097).
[25] Egger, H., & Egger, P. (2003). Outsourcing and Skill-Specific Employment
in a Small Country: Austria after the Fall of the Iron Curtain. Oxford
Economic Papers, 55(2003), 625-643.
[26] Feenstra, R. C. (2004). Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evi-
dence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
26
[27] Feenstra, R. C. (2010). Oﬀshoring in the Global Economy – Microeconomic
Structure and Macroeconomic Implications. Cambridge and London: The
MIT Press.
[28] Feenstra, R. C., & Hanson, G. H. (1996). Globalization, Outsourcing and
Wage Inequality. American Economic Review, 86(2), 240-245.
[29] Freund, C., & Weinhold, D. (2002). The Internet and International Trade
in Services. The American Economic Review, 92(2), 236-240.
[30] Garner, A. C. (2004). Oﬀshoring in the Service Sector: Economic Impact
and Policy Issues. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City - Economic Review
2004(3), 5-37.
[31] Gourieroux, C., Monfort, A., & Trognon, A. (1984). Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood Methods: Theory. Econometrica, 52(3), 681-700.
[32] Greene, W. (1994). Accounting for Excess Zeros and Sample Selection in
Poisson and Negative Binomial Models. Stern School of Business, New York
University - Working Paper (94-10).
[33] Grossman, G. (1996). Comments on Alan V. Deardorﬀ: Determinants of
Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a Neoclassical World? In J. A.
Frankel (Ed.), The Regionalization of the World Economy. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
[34] Grossman, G. M., & Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2006). The Rise of Oﬀshoring:
It’s Not Wine for Cloth Anymore. Paper presented at the The New
Economic Geography: Eﬀects and Policy Implications. Retrieved from
http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2006/sym06prg.htm
[35] Hatzichronoglou, T. (2005). The Impact of Oﬀshoring on Employment:
Measurement Issues and Implications. Paris, Washington, DC: OECD.
[36] Head, K., Mayer, T., & Ries, J. (2009). How Remote is the Oﬀshoring
Threat? European Economic Review, 53, 429-444.
[37] Helpman, E. (2006). Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms. NBER
Working Paper (No. 12091).
[38] Huang, R. R. (2007). Distance and Trade: Disentangling Unfamiliarity and
Transport Cost Eﬀects. European Economic Review, 51(1), 161-181.
[39] Jensen, J. B. (2011). Global Trade in Services - Fear, Facts and Oﬀshoring.
Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
[40] Jensen, B. J., & Kletzer, L. (2005). Tradable Services: Understanding the
Scope and Impact of Services Oﬀshoring. In L. Brainard & S. M. Collins
(Eds.), Brookings Trade Forum: Oﬀshoring White-Collar Work – The Is-
sues and the Implications (pp. 73-133). Washington, DC: Brookings Insti-
tution Press.
27
[41] Kandilov, I., & Grennes, T. (2007). The Determinants of Service Oﬀshoring:
Does Distance Matter? Working Paper, North Carolina State University,
Raleigh, NC.
[42] Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2009). Governance Matters
VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008. World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper (No. 4978).
[43] Koncz, J., & Flatness, A. (2008). U.S. international Services - Cross-Border
Trade in 2007 and Services Supplied Through Aﬃliates in 2006. Survey of
Current Business 16-37.
[44] Leamer, E. E., & Storper, M. (2001). The Economic Geography of the
Internet Age. Journal of International Business Studies, 32(4), 641-665.
[45] Levchenko, A. A. (2007). Institutional Quality and International Trade.
Review of Economic Studies, 74, 791-819.
[46] Levy, F., & Murnane, R. J. (2006). How Computerized Work and Glob-
alization Shape Human Skill Demands. Mimeo. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
[47] Manning, S., Roza, M., Lewin, A. Y., & Volberda, H. W. (2009). Why Dis-
tance Matters: the Dynamics of Oﬀshore Location Choices. Duke CIBER
Working Paper.
[48] McCarthy, J. C. (2002). 3.3 Million US Services Jobs To Go Oﬀshore:
Forrester Research.
[49] Manova, K. (2008). Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and Interna-
tional Trade. NBER Working Paper (No. 14531).
[50] Miroudot, S., Lanz, R., & Ragoussis, A. (2009). Trade in Intermediate
Goods and Services. OECD Trade Policy Working Paper (No. 93).
[51] Moncarz, R. J., Wolf, M. G., & Wright, B. (2008). Service-providing Occu-
pations, Oﬀshoring, and the Labor Market. BLS Monthly Labor Review,
71-86.
[52] National Academy of Public Administration. (2006). Oﬀshoring: How big
is it? - Report for the U.S. Congress and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
[53] Nicolini, M. (2007). Institutions and Oﬀshoring Decision. CESifo Institute
for Economic Research, Working Paper (No. 2074).
[54] Nunn, N. (2007). Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the
Pattern of Trade. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), 569-600.
[55] OECD. (2000). Literacy in the Information Age - Final Report of the In-
ternational Adult Literacy Survey. Paris, Washington, DC: OECD.
28
[56] OECD. (2007a). OECD Employment Outlook. Paris, Washington, DC:
OECD.
[57] OECD. (2007b). Oﬀshoring and Employment: Trends and Impacts. Paris,
Washington, DC: OECD.
[58] Oldenski, L. (2012). Export Versus FDI and the Communication of Com-
plex Information. Journal of International Economics, forthcoming.
[59] Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1998). Financial Dependence and Growth.
American Economic Review, 88(3), 559-586.
[60] Santos Silva, J. M. C., & Tenreyro, S. (2006). The Log of Gravity. Review
of Economics and Statistics, 88(4), 641-658.
[61] Stein, E., & Daude, C. (2007). Longitude Matters: Time Zones and the
Location of Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of International Economics,
71(1), 96-112.
[62] United States Government Accountability Oﬃce. (2004). International
Trade - Current Government Data Provide Limited Insight into Oﬀshoring
of Services.
[63] Westerlund, J., & Wilhemsson, F. (2006). Estimating the Grav-
ity Model without Gravity Using Panel Data. Retrieved from
http://folk.uio.no/rnymoen/Estimating%20the%20gravity%20model.pdf
[64] Winkelmann, R. (2008). Econometric Analysis of Count Data (5th ed.).
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
[65] Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric Analysis of Cross-Section and Panel
Data (second ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Appendix A: Oﬀshoring proxy










The information on bilateral U.S. services imports comes from BEA bilateral
trade data. In Table 5 of the Detailed statistics for cross-border trade the BEA
provides information on telecommunications, financial services and insurance
services. In Table 7 the BEA oﬀers information by trading partner at the level of
legal services, computer and information services, management, consulting, and
public relations as well as other business, professional, and technical services.
The remaining information needed to estimate these equations comes from BEA
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input-output tables (The Use of Commodities by Industries before Redefinitions
(1997 to 2009)). Following the National Academy of Public Administration
(2006, p.62), the ratio of intermediate uses to total domestic supply per service
category is calculated as follows. On the one hand, to calculate total domestic
supply per service category, Service Imports (SI) are added on to Total Service
Output (TSO) because they enhance domestic availability of a certain service.
On the other hand, domestic availability decreases if the service is exported or
stored so that Exports (SE) have to be subtracted.
BEA bilateral trade data oﬀer information on U.S. imports of other pri-
vate services. The following list helps to illustrate the structure of the service











Business, professional, and technical services
Computer and information services
Management and consulting services
Research and development and testing services
Legal services
Other services
For the period 2006 to 2009, data for aﬃliated as well as unaﬃliated bilateral
trade is available for the following 12 subcategories of other private services. Ed-
ucation includes payments of U.S. students studying abroad and excludes pay-
ments for distance-learning. These payments are included in training services
(see Koncz and Flatness 2008). Hence, I will exclude this category because it
does not measure service oﬀshoring (for a similar argument see Amiti and Wei
2006).
Other (private) Services consist mainly of copyright payments for foreign
motion pictures and television programs (see Koncz and Flatness 2008, p.20)
Business, professional, and technical services can again be classified into nine
diﬀerent subcategories. Unfortunately, input-output tables provide information
for the components of the category business, professional, and technical services
only at a more aggregate level than bilateral trade data. As a result, within busi-
ness, professional, and technical services my analysis is restricted to six service
subcategories.51 Activities within the two subcategories, construction, architec-
tural, and engineering services as well as installation, maintenance and repair
of equipment, need to be performed in a fixed location. As a result, I classify
them as non-tradable and exclude them. The remaining subcategories include
51Input-output tables oﬀer no information on the following subcategories: industrial engi-
neering; research, development and testing services; and advertising.
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computer and information services, legal services, management, consulting and
public relations as well as other business, professional, and technical services.
Traded services in bilateral trade data are classified according to commodity
basis, with commodity groups approximating North American Industry Clas-
sification System (NAICS) categories. In input-output tables commodities are
classified according to so-called input-output codes. The BEA oﬀers a concor-
dance list between these codes and the industry classifications, according to the
six-digit 2002 NAICS. As a result, information on oﬀshored services from both
data sources can be converted to a common classification, i.e. NAICS.
The concordance between commodity group titles and six-digit 2002 NAICS
codes has been done according to information provided in Table 7 of the BEA
Detailed statistics for cross-border trade in combination with information on the
content of industries according to the NAICS classification. The concordance
between input-output codes and NAICS codes has been done according to the
list provided in BEA input-output tables. The results are displayed in table
3 and table 4 lists the destination countries of U.S. service oﬀshoring between
2006 and 2009.
Table 3: Concordance between BEA commodity codes, input-output codes and
NAICS codes
Commodity industry Input-output codes 2002 NAICS codes
Financial services 521C1, 523, 525 522000, 523000,525000
Insurance services 524 524000
Telecommunications 513 517000
Computer and information services 5415, 514 541500
Management, consulting 55 551100and public relations
Legal services 5411 541100
Other (business, professional 5412OP 541900and technical) services
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Table 4: U.S. service oﬀshoring destinations
Argentina Germany Malaysia Spain
Australia Hong Kong SAR, China Mexico Sweden
Belgium India Netherlands Switzerland
Bermuda Indonesia New Zealand Thailand
Brazil Ireland Norway United Kingdom
Canada Israel Philippines Venezuela, RB
Chile Italy Saudi Arabia
China Japan Singapore
France Korea, Rep. South Africa
Appendix B: Oﬀshorability indices
The 2000 SOC system52 distinguishes between 840 detailed occupations ac-
cording to their occupational definition. To facilitate classification, detailed
occupations with similar job duties, and in some cases skills, education, and/or
training, are grouped together in 461 broad occupations, 97 minor groups, and
23 major groups. Service occupations include the major groups 11, 13, 15 to
29, 31 to 39, 41, 43, 49 and 53. For further information see the Bureau of
Labor Statistics webpage. Several, not clearly defined terms are used in the
context of material and service oﬀshoring.53 In this paper, the notion service
occupations will be used for service-providing occupations regardless of the in-
dustry they are performed in. Of all service occupations, Moncarz et al. (2008)
classified the following major groups entirely as non-tradable: community and
social services occupations (SOC 21-0000); food preparation and serving related
occupations (SOC 35-000); building and grounds cleaning and maintenance oc-
cupations (SOC 37-0000); personal care and service occupations (SOC 39-0000);
and transportation and material moving occupations (SOC 53-0000).
Table 5 exemplarily illustrates the information on occupational-level oﬀ-
shorability provided in Moncarz et al. (2008) for the major group management
occupations:
52A first SOC Manual was published in 1977 with revisions in 1980, 2000 and 2010. For
more information on the history of occupational data classifications in the U.S., see Bureau
of Labor Statistics (2001, p.105ﬀ.).
53One example is an estimate conducted by McCarthy (2002) for Forrester Research. The
results predict 3.3 million U.S. service-industry occupations to be oﬀshored by 2015. How-
ever, in the further details it becomes clear, that service occupations in general, existing in
manufacturing as well as in service industries, were considered.
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Table 5: Oﬀshoring susceptibility score
SOC code Occupation title Oﬀshoring susceptibility score
Moncarz et al. (2008)
11-0000 Management occupations
11-3041 Compensation and benefits 9
managers
11-3031 Financial managers 7
11-3042 Training and development 7
managers
11-1011 Chief executives 6
10-1021 General and operations 6
managers
11-3011 Administrative services 6
managers
11-3021 Computer and information systems 6
11-2011 Advertising and promotions 5
managers
11-2021 Marketing managers 5
11-2022 Sales managers 5
11-2031 Public relations managers 5
11-9041 Engineering managers 5
11-9121 Natural science managers 5
Source: Moncarz et al. (2008)
Of all service occupations, Moncarz et al. (2008) classified the following
major groups entirely as non-tradable: community and social services occupa-
tions (SOC 21-0000); food preparation and serving related occupations (SOC
35-000); building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations (SOC 37-
0000); personal care and service occupations (SOC 39-0000); and transportation
and material moving occupations (SOC 53-0000). Table 6 reports the correla-
tions between the measure of coordination requirements and skill intensities of
production. As shown, the measure of coordination requirements is correlated
with skill intensity. Industries that require most coordination prerequisites tend
to be less skill intensive.
Table 6: Correlation coeﬃcients between industry-level characteristics
Moncarz et al.
Skill intensity -0.7202
Appendix C: Additional data
GDP (current U.S. dollars) and population for all countries are provided by the
World Development Indicators database. Average years of tertiary schooling
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are provided by theBarro-Lee database on educational attainment. Educational
information at the occupational-level is taken from Moncarz et al. (2008) and
then aggregated up to the industry level in the way described in 3.2 for the
oﬀshorability proxy. Geographic distance is most frequently measured between
the economic centers of countries, with the centers assumed to be the capitals,
this is the so-called great circle distance. A first obvious problem is the fact
that proxying the economic center with the capital may be more appropriate
for smaller countries than for large ones, including the U.S. The U.S. has several
diﬀerent major cities, widely apart from each other, each specialized in diﬀerent
services (see e.g. Bussière and Schnatz 2006). Hence, I follow e.g. Kandilov
and Grennes (2007) and additionally use the weighted distance measure. Both
distance measures are provided by theCEPII database . Time zone diﬀerences
are calculated in hours separating the countries’ capitals, varying from 0 to 12.
Information on time zones was obtained from Wikipedia and from the World
clock. I followed Head et al. (2009) and calculated time zone diﬀerences by em-
ploying min {|hUS − hc| , 24− |hUS − hc|}. Based on information provided by
the ethnologue-based version of common language, I created a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if at least nine percent of the population in the des-
tination country speak English. A dummy which indicates whether English is
an oﬃcial language in the destination countries might not provide a very good
proxy for the existence of English skills in the relevant business circles. En-
glish is a common second language in many countries, e.g. in educational and
business environments. For instance, English is the standard in the provision
of technology related services (e.g. Rishi and Saxena 2005, p.8). The dummy
for a common legal system takes the value of one if the destination country is
– like the U.S. - classified as having UK legal origins. Information on this is
taken from Andrei Shleifer’s database. Moreover, I control for the quality of
legal institutions in the destination country by employing information on the
rule of law from Kaufmann et al. (2009). I transform the original variable so
that it only takes on non-negative values. NAFTA membership is indicated by a
dummy variable taking the value of one if the country is a member, i.e. Canada
and Mexico. I follow e.g. Kandilov and Grennes (2007) and Head et al. (2009)
and employ information on past colonial ties as a proxy for cultural similarity.
This information comes again from the CEPII bilateral database. Information
on variables for internet users as a fraction of the population, personal comput-
ers as a fraction of the population as well as secure servers per 10,000 people,
come again from theWorld Development Indicators database.
Table 7 shows the summary statistics for these country-level variables. All
variables have the expected range. Table 8 shows the correlation coeﬃcients be-
tween country-level variables. The correlation between some explanatory vari-
ables, i.e. the quality of legal institutions and availability of the internet, is
surprisingly high (0.6171).
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Table 7: Country-level characteristics, summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Colonial past 5124 .0327869 .1780957 0 1
Common language 5124 .420765 .4937301 0 1
log(Distance) 5124 8.934286 .5365834 6.306995 9.691551
log(GDP per capita) 4928 8.278473 1.596703 4.794486 11.67806
Internet penetration 4795 147.8556 329.373 .0127152 3229.814
Legal origin UK 5124 .3224044 .4674424 0 1
NAFTA 5124 .010929 .103979 0 1
Rule of law 5096 .5637054 .2120641 1337076 .9999999
Time zone diﬀerence 5124 5.68306 3.282677 0 12
Skill endowment 3892 .3780683 .3182467 .0064 1.5562
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Appendix D: Additional regression results
Table 10 presents the results for zero-inflated Poisson regressions that include
diﬀerent regressors. Column (1) is the specification shown in column (2) of table
2. Column (4) is identical to the preferred specification shown in column (3) of
table 2. Diﬀerent tests confirm that favoring this last model is appropriate.
To decide which variables to include in the model, I perform the Wald test.
The Wald test shows that I cannot reject H0 : β = 0 for the following variables -
-internet penetration, - time zone diﬀerences, - common legal origin, - rule of law,
and - common language, both separately and interacted with the coordination
requirements, because p > 0.05. However, based on economic reasoning, I keep
the interaction terms with time zone diﬀerences and common language because
the interaction term with distance could otherwise be biased. As Kandilov
and Grennes (2007) have shown distance is a proxy for time zone diﬀerences
and linguistic diﬀerences. Time zone diﬀerences and geographic distance are
accordingly highly correlated (0.7233; see table 8 in appendix C).
The Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information crite-
rion (BIC) can be used to select among several (nested and non-nested) models.
Both criteria are based on the log likelihood of the model and introduce penal-
ties for adding parameters to the model, which can increase the log likelihood.
Stata calculates them as follows:
AIC = −2 lnL+ 2Pk
BIC = −2 lnL+ Pk lnN
where lnL is the log likelihood of the model and 2Pk and Pk lnN are the
penalties for the model size. Note that the BIC penalizes model size stronger.
Because a larger log likelihood is preferred, the model with a smaller AIC and
BIC is favored, in particular the second model is favored when BIC1−BIC2 > 0
(see Long and Freese 2006, p.112f.; Cameron and Trivedi 2010, p.359f.). Raftery
(1996) suggests the following guidelines for assessing the diﬀerence in the BICs
from diﬀerent models:






Source: Long and Freese (2006, p.113)
In the present analysis, there is at least strong evidence in favor of the last
specification (column (4)) in comparison with every other specification.
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Table 10: Zero-inflated Poisson regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ZIP ZIP ZIP ZIP
Oﬀshorability score -25.88 -25.86 -25.64 -33.06*
(16.91) (16.86) (15.90) (15.96)
Internet penetration -0.000185
*oﬀshorability score (0.00136)
Common legal origin -0.431 -0.434
*oﬀshorability score (0.797) (0.788)
Rule of law -2.149 -2.393 -2.587
*oﬀshorability score (2.321) (1.888) (1.772)
Time zone
diﬀerences
-0.0521 -0.0482 -0.0528 -0.0910
*oﬀshorability score (0.309) (0.306) (0.297) (0.290)
Common language -0.911 -0.922 -1.203 -1.370
*oﬀshorability score (0.899) (0.874) (1.120) (1.085)
colonial past 2.043* 2.072* 2.169* 2.343*
*oﬀshorability score (0.975) (0.906) (0.928) (0.959)
NAFTA 9.796* 9.825* 9.731* 11.06**
*oﬀshorability score (4.482) (4.419) (4.201) (4.240)
log(geographic
distance)
3.090 3.098 3.085 3.703
*oﬀshorability score (2.113) (2.105) (1.998) (1.986)
Skill intensity 1.234 1.216 1.255 1.047
(1.348) (1.295) (1.324) (1.309)
Skill endowment 0.0596 0.0409 0.0766 -0.0873
(1.087) (1.070) (1.116) (1.100)
*skill intensity -1.063 -1.037 -1.087 -0.784
(1.599) (1.517) (1.554) (1.425)
log(GDP per capita) -0.153 -0.152 -0.141 -0.160
(0.619) (0.618) (0.609) (0.606)
Fixed eﬀects Year Year Year Year
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Table 10: continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ZIP ZIP ZIP ZIP
Observations 3724 3724 3724 3724
Log
pseudolikelihood
-4.657717 -4.657764 -4.658309 -4.661246
AIC 109.3 105.3 107.3 103.3
BIC 420.4 404.0 412.2 395.8
Columns (1) to (4): clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses;
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